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Abstract 
This paper investigates the large and diverse discounts in UK open offers and placings. Large 
discounts are a substantial cost to shareholders who do not buy new shares. The existing 
literature mainly examines US firm-commitment offers and private placements, but UK open 
offers and placings differ from both types of US offer. The paper presents evidence that 
inelastic demand, illiquidity of the issuer’s shares, and financial distress are key determinants 
of the discount. The effects of inelastic demand and distress are much more apparent in UK 
than in US SEOs. We argue that institutional features obscure the role of these variables in 
the US context. 
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1. Introduction 
 It is usual for the offer price in seasoned equity offers (SEOs) to be set below the 
midpoint market price of the issuer’s shares immediately before the issue is announced. This 
discount, or underpricing, provides a reward to investors who buy the new shares, and is a 
cost to existing shareholders who do not buy the shares, or who buy fewer than the number 
needed to maintain their percentage holding. The current paper is the first detailed study of 
the discounts in UK open offers and placings. In our sample 90% of open offers and placings 
are at a discount, and the average discount to the pre-announcement market price as a 
percentage of the offer price is 26% (median 11%). This is much larger than the average 
discount of around 3% in US firm-commitment offers, but is comparable to the discount in 
US private placements. 
 The purpose of the paper is to investigate the large cross-sectional differences across 
discounts in open offers and large placings, of at least five per cent of the existing equity. 
There have been several enquiries by government bodies and academic researchers into the 
direct costs of SEOs, the most recent being by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT, 2011). Yet 
discounts are on average a bigger cost for nonsubscribers, as the paper documents, and there 
are many nonsubscribers: it is common for existing shareholders not to buy new shares in 
open offers and placings, despite the presence of substantial discounts (Armitage, 2010). A 
large discount is an especial concern to shareholders if they do not have an automatic ‘pre-
emption’ right to buy new shares, because then they may not be given the opportunity to buy 
any of the discounted shares. Placings have become the most common method of issue in the 
UK, and there is no pre-emption right in a placing. 
 We argue in Section 2 and the Appendix that institutional differences between the USA 
and UK mean that, a priori, there are only three potential explanations for discounts, and for 
the cross-sectional variation in discounts, that are relevant to the bulk of UK offers. These 
explanations are inelastic demand for the shares, information asymmetry, and financial 
distress of the issuer. Consider, first, elasticity of demand or liquidity of the shares.
1
 An SEO 
involves an increase in the supply of shares for sale when the issue is being marketed, and the 
number of new shares is usually many times larger than the average number of existing 
shares traded per day. The median multiple of new shares over the average number traded per 
day is 195 times (Table 1). Many of the shares in our sample are very illiquid, and we 
conjecture that there is a downward-sloping demand curve for such shares. 
                                                 
1
 The elasticity of demand for a share and its liquidity are difficult to separate both conceptually and empirically, 
as discussed in Section 2.2. 
 2 
Demand for a given share will be less than perfectly elastic if (i) there is a limit to the 
number of shares a given investor is willing to buy at a given price, and (ii) there is a limit to 
the number of investors willing to buy any shares at a given price. Regarding (i), several 
factors could limit demand on the part of a given investor. A large enough holding could 
imply unwanted active involvement in the company, or impair the diversification of the 
investor’s portfolio, or be costly to sell; it might be costly to raise sufficient cash to buy a 
large block, and a managed fund might have a limit on how much the fund can hold in any 
one company. Regarding (ii), there is evidence that investors disagree about the value of a 
given company, and that they re-appraise their valuations at the time of major corporate 
events. Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) and Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) argue that 
an increase in unfavourable re-evaluations by shareholders explains, respectively, negative 
momentum in stocks and large falls in share price on announcement of takeovers. Armitage 
(2010) finds evidence of limited demand on the part of investors in UK open offers and 
placings. Institutional investors are the main buyers, and they very rarely accumulate a stake 
in a given company in excess of 20%. He also finds evidence of heterogeneous valuations of 
issuers; on average, more than half of the existing shareholders do not buy any new shares, 
despite the substantial discounts. The idea of Hertzel et al (2002), that firms making 
placements are overvalued, and that as a result placees are able to negotiate a purchase price 
well below the market price, envisages disagreement about value between market investors 
and placees. In addition, there is a variety of other evidence that the demand for shares is 
materially less than perfectly elastic (Gao and Ritter, 2010, and Huang and Zhang, 2011, 
include reviews).
2
 
It is plausible that there are separate markets for the new and existing shares, which is 
necessary for inelastic demand to be able to explain the existence of a discount. Through the 
bookbuilding or placing process, the arranging bank estimates the demand schedule and sets 
an offer price at which there will be buyers for all the new shares. The prices of trades of 
existing shares need not be much affected by the fact that many new shares are about to be 
issued. The marketing of the new shares is a separate process from normal trading, involving 
direct contact between the company and selected potential buyers, and transmission of private 
information. These points are especially applicable in UK open offers and placings, because 
all or most of the marketing is done on a discreet basis before the offer is publicly announced. 
                                                 
2
 Ivashina and Sun (2011) provide further evidence and discussion of the effects of inelastic demand on the sale 
process and pricing of financial assets, in this case syndicated loans. In their view, ‘the syndication process 
matches borrowers with the set of investors with the highest valuations’ (p. 505). This is exactly the function of 
the placing process for equity, if investor demand is seen as inelastic. 
 3 
The impending issue is price-sensitive information, and investors who agree to become 
informed about the issue also agree not to trade in the relevant company’s shares until after 
the issue is announced. Only investors contacted by the arranger should know about the issue 
during the pre-announcement marketing process. Investors ignorant of the offer will continue 
to trade shares via the normal market process. Hence, there is a separation between the 
primary market for new shares and the secondary market for existing shares during the pre-
announcement marketing period, at the end of which the offer price is set. Huang and Zhang 
(2011) discuss why the primary and secondary markets are partially separate in the case of 
US firm-commitment offers. 
An alternative view to the above is that the increase in the supply of shares will drive 
down the market price of the existing shares during the period in which the new shares are 
being marketed. There will be temporary ‘price pressure’. Inelastic demand reduces the offer 
price because it reduces the market price at the time the offer price is set. Loderer, Cooney 
and Van Drunen (1991) report a negative average abnormal return on the announcement of 
firm- commitment offers by regulated firms. They argue that as information asymmetry is 
low for such firms, the price fall is partly explained by inelastic demand. Altinkiliç and 
Hansen (2005) and Meidan (2005) find weak evidence of temporary price pressure during the 
bookbuilding period in firm commitments. Gao and Ritter (2010) argue that the purpose of 
the marketing effort during firm commitments is to increase demand elasticity in order to 
reduce downward pressure on the share price.
3
 These papers ignore the existence of discounts 
in firm commitments. The implication is that the main potential impact of inelastic demand is 
on the share price rather than on the discount. This approach is easier to justify when the 
mean discount is 3%, as in firm commitments, than when the mean is 26%, as in open offers 
and placings. In addition, there is no existing evidence for price pressure in open offers and 
placings. The average abnormal return is positive on announcement of both types of offer, 
contrary to the predictions of the price-pressure explanation. 
An important potentially competing explanation for discounts, beyond inelastic demand 
and illiquidity, is information asymmetry.
4
 Numerous studies find that discounts are related to 
variables interpreted as proxies for the transparency of the issuing firm. Despite the intuitive 
appeal of information asymmetry as an explanation for discounts, there is no accepted theory 
                                                 
3
 Several early papers hypothesise that, if the negative average abnormal return on announcement of firm-
commitment offers is due to inelastic demand, there should be a negative relation between the abnormal return 
and the relative offer size. The evidence is mixed; Armitage (1998) includes a brief review. 
4
 Information asymmetry could be a reason for inelastic demand: lower transparency could result in fewer 
investors who would consider buying the shares, and greater heterogeneity of investors’ valuations. 
 4 
that links the two. The well-known Myers-Majluf (1984) theory, which assumes information 
asymmetry, predicts a fall in the market price on announcement of the issue, but it does not 
predict the existence of a discount. Hertzel and Smith (1993) argue that discounts in private 
placements are compensation for the cost to placees of investigating the issuer, a cost which 
is necessary in order to reduce uncertainty about the value of the issuer. But this explanation 
has not gained acceptance, partly because the size of many placement discounts would imply 
implausibly large costs of investigation (Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan, 2007). 
A third possible explanation, at least for some discounts, is that the issuer is in financial 
distress. There are at least two reasons why distress might affect the discount. First, both 
agency costs and information asymmetry could be more severe for firms in distress. Second, 
in cases of severe distress, where the alternative to raising equity is likely to be bankruptcy, 
we might expect suppliers of external equity to be able to extract additional value for 
themselves, beyond that available in an offer by a non-distressed issuer. External capital is 
needed to maintain the value of the issuer as a going concern. Some or all of this going-
concern value would be lost if the issuer were to enter bankruptcy proceedings. Knowing this, 
an external investor should be able to bargain to obtain some of the going-concern value that 
would be lost in the absence of external funds. 
Our research investigates the extent to which variables linked to the above three 
explanations can explain cross-sectional differences in discounts. In particular, we seek to test 
whether discounts are explained better by inelastic demand or by information asymmetry. We 
calculate eight proxies for demand elasticity, namely three measures of offer size in relation 
to the size of the issuer, four measures of liquidity, and issuer size. We also attempt to isolate 
the impact of information asymmetry on discounts. Four variables are calculated which ought 
to proxy for information asymmetry, but which are not measures of inelastic demand or 
liquidity. Three are measures of earnings quality; they are among the measures calculated by 
Lee and Masulis (2009), who study the impact of information asymmetry on the direct costs 
of SEOs. 
All the proxies for inelastic demand are statistically significant individually, both in a 
simple univariate test and in multivariate regressions that include the non-elasticity variables. 
However, tests show that multicollinearity is a problem in regressions that include 
combinations of the elasticity variables, with the consequence that some of the elasticity 
variables do not exhibit consistent levels of significance across different regression 
specifications. In view of this problem of multicollinearity, we use principal components 
 5 
analysis to create a single elasticity variable derived from seven of the individual variables.
5
 
This single variable is the first principal component, and it is always highly significant. In 
contrast, none of the four measures of information asymmetry is significantly related to the 
discount in a multivariate setting, though there is some univariate evidence of a relation 
between earnings quality and discount. We find, in addition, financial distress has a major 
impact on the discount. 
The results show very clearly that differences across shares in elasticity of demand or 
liquidity are able to explain variation in discounts. Financial distress is an additional 
significant explanatory variable. In contrast, differences in information asymmetry have little 
explanatory power. A possible explanation for the latter finding is that our proxies for 
information asymmetry are unreliable due to data limitations. Quantile regressions indicate 
that the variables have most explanatory power for large discounts, though the elasticity 
variable is significant in all the quantiles. 
The importance of demand elasticity and financial distress is not as evident in existing 
research, most of which is on US firm-commitment offers or on private placements. This is 
partly because institutional differences mean that there are more possible explanations for 
discounts in US than in UK SEOs, as mentioned above. The contrast between firm 
commitments and placements also matters. Discounts are small in firm-commitment or public 
offers, and much less varied than in UK SEOs. We offer two suggestions why inelastic 
demand does not result in large or varied discounts in firm commitments. First, companies 
choosing firm commitments are much larger than those choosing private placements, and 
larger size is associated with greater elasticity of demand and liquidity of the shares.
6
 Second, 
firm-commitment offers are marketed by an underwriting syndicate during the public 
bookbuilding period, with the purpose of creating demand (Gao and Ritter, 2010; Huang and 
Zhang, 2011). In UK open offers and placings the pre-announcement marketing is conducted 
on a private basis, typically be a single bank. It is possible that arranging banks place less 
reliance on marketing to generate demand, and more on the discount, than is the case in the 
USA.  
Discounts in private placements are much larger. However, they are not viewed as 
arising from inelastic demand, because there are usually only one or two buyers, and because 
the restriction on re-sale of the new shares in US placements is on its own a possible reason 
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 Principal components analysis has not been used in previous research on discounts in SEOs, but the nature of 
our investigation and of the results mean that it is a natural step to deploy this technique. 
6
 In the sample of Chen, Dai and Schatzberg (2010), the median firm-commitment issuer has a book value of 
assets that is 14.7 times larger than the median placement issuer (p. 108). 
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for large discounts. There is no restriction on selling the new shares in UK SEOs, and there 
are normally at least 20 buyers in open offers and large placings.  
Financial distress has not been identified as an important explanatory variable in studies 
of discounts in US SEOs. That might be because its impact is on the choice of issue method 
and type of security issued. Many distressed US companies choose a private placement rather 
than a public offer, or an issue of convertible securities, or a placement combined with 
warrants (Chen, Dai and Schatzberg, 2010). In the UK, distressed companies tend simply to 
issue ‘straight’ equity at a deep discount. 
The next section outlines the relevant SEO procedures and reviews previous research on 
discounts. Section 3 explains the research method and data. Section 4 presents the results on 
discount and on cost. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background and previous research 
2.1 Types of offer 
 Since much of the existing evidence is from the USA, a little background is needed on 
UK SEOs. In an open offer the shares are placed by private negotiation - a discreet 
bookbuilding process - before the offer is formally announced. Investors who have been 
contacted by the arranging bank, and who wish to buy shares, provide verbal agreements to 
buy before the announcement, and the agreements are normally signed on the announcement 
day. The shares are then offered on a pro rata basis to existing shareholders after the 
announcement, and the offer is open for at least two weeks. The entitlements to buy new 
shares cannot be traded, unlike in a rights issue. In a placing, the process is the same except 
that there is no pro rata offer following the announcement. The offer price in both types of 
offer is normally set the day before the offer is publicly announced. The new shares are 
issued the day after the extraordinary general meeting that is normally necessary to authorise 
the open offer or placing; this meeting is held three to four weeks after the announcement.
7
  
In both types of offer, there are typically at least 20 buyers, the bulk of which are 
investing institutions (Armitage, 2011). Discounts are substantial and there is wide variation 
across issues. The discount is a cost to shareholders who do not buy new shares, or do not 
take up all of their entitlement in an open offer. For example, if the share price before the 
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 Two other issue methods are employed in the UK. In a rights issue, shareholders can sell their rights, and 
because of this, the cost of the discount to nonsubscribers depends in part on the cost of selling the rights. In an 
accelerated bookbuilding, the arranging bank announces the issue and invites institutional investors to bid for 
the shares. The book is usually closed within one day. This latter method tends to be used by large companies to 
raise small amounts of equity in relation to their size. Discounts are small (a few per cent). We do not examine 
either rights issues or accelerated bookbuildings. 
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announcement of the issue is £1.00, the offer price is £0.90, and the share price remains at 
£1.00 after the announcement, the reward to buyers of the new shares is 11% of the offer 
price. The share price might be expected to fall because of news of the discount. However, 
the average abnormal return is positive on announcement of open offers and placings 
(Armitage, 2012, includes a summary of the evidence). If the share price does not fall, it 
might appear as though nonsubscribers do not lose because of the discount. But if the offer 
price in the example had been higher than £0.90, and all else had been the same, the share 
price would have been higher than £1.00 after the announcement.
8
  
Turning to US SEOs, in a firm-commitment or public offer, the new shares are sold via a 
bookbuilding process which starts when the offer is announced and ends three or four weeks 
later, just before the shares are issued. The offer price is set the evening before the issue date. 
Since the early 1990s the offer price has been set on average 3% below the market price as at 
the close of the day before the issue date. Most discounts are clustered within a few 
percentage points of 3% (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003, Figure 1). In a private placement, the 
shares are placed by private negotiation with one or a few investors. The new shares initially 
are not registered with the SEC, and they cannot be sold until they are registered, except via 
private negotiation. In recent years private investment in public equity (PIPE) placements 
have become the norm. Registration typically occurs within 60 days of signing the placement 
agreement, instead of after the one-year delay that applied in earlier placements (six months 
from February 2008; Maynes and Pandes, 2010). The lead investor in US placements is 
usually a private-equity, venture-capital or hedge fund, or an individual, or another company. 
Participation by mainstream institutional investors is limited, in contrast to the case in UK 
open offers and placings. The average discount to the market price in private placements was 
around 16% in the 1990s and 10% in the 2000s (Huson, Malatesta and Parrino, 2009), but 
nearly one fifth of US placements are made at a premium (Dai, 2007). So discounts in 
placements are much larger and more variable than in public offers. 
Open offers and placings resemble US firm commitments in that the new shares are 
bought by more than one or two buyers, following a bookbuilding process (although 
bookbuilding is discrete in the UK and is normally completed before the issue is publicly 
announced). However, the discounts in open offers and placings are much deeper and more 
variable than in firm commitments, resembling those found in US private placements. 
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 No change in the share price implies either that the issue and its offer price of £0.90 were already expected by 
the market, or that good news was announced at the same time as the issue, which offset the impact of selling 
new shares at below the market price. Either way, an offer price higher than £0.90 implies an increase in the 
share price on announcement. 
 8 
 
2.2 Determinants of discounts 
Several explanations for discounts in SEOs have been proposed. Here we discuss those 
which are potentially important for UK open offers and placings. Explanations which do not 
apply, or which are unlikely to be important, are reviewed in the Appendix.  
Inelastic demand. A larger offer in relation to the size of the issuer is associated with a 
deeper discount, and this is often seen as evidence for inelastic demand in firm-commitment 
offers (for example, Corwin, 2003). Intintoli and Kahle (2009) find that relative size is a more 
significant explanatory variable when offer size is measured as a proportion of the free float, 
which supports the inelastic-demand interpretation. Huang and Zhang (2011) view the 
number of lead underwriters as a proxy for marketing effort, and they argue that the benefit 
of marketing is greater elasticity and a smaller discount. They find a negative relation 
between the discount and the number of co-lead underwriters. They also show that if an 
investor has a prior relationship with an underwriter, this increases the probability that the 
relevant investor will participate in the offer. The discount is negatively related to the number 
of ‘relationship investors’ of the lead and co-underwriters. Unfortunately, the number of co-
lead managers cannot be used as a proxy in the UK context, because most issues have one 
arranger only and the maximum in our sample is three. Gao and Ritter (2010) present 
evidence that the marketing of the offer in firm commitments increases the short-run 
elasticity of demand for the shares, and that firms with relatively inelastic demand are more 
likely to choose a firm-commitment offer instead of accelerated bookbuilding, which 
involves much less marketing.
9
 
Inelastic demand has not been considered explicitly as an explanation for discounts in 
placements. However, some findings are suggestive. The discount is positively related to the 
relative size of the issue (Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Maynes and Pandes, 2010) and to the 
number of placees (Wruck and Wu, 2009; Huson et al, 2009). In addition, the argument that 
placements exist partly to enable the placee(s) to obtain costly private information about the 
issuer assumes that demand at the prevailing market price from less well-informed investors 
is insufficiently elastic. 
For the UK, Armitage (2007) studies discounts in placings of large blocks of rights to 
new shares that have been renounced by the shareholders entitled to them. The discounts are 
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 Consistent with the hypothesis that the marketing effort is greater when demand is inelastic, Butler, Grullon 
and Weston (2005) present evidence that the direct cost of firm commitments is negatively related to the 
liquidity of the issuer’s shares. 
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positively related to bid-ask spread and relative issue size. He interprets this as evidence for 
inelastic demand. 
The elasticity of demand and liquidity of a given share are closely linked conceptually 
and empirically, and causality plausibly runs in both directions. It is hard to conceive of a 
liquid share with very inelastic demand, or an illiquid share with very elastic demand. Proxies 
for elasticity, such as bid-ask spread or the price impact of share trades, are also measures of 
liquidity. For these reasons we do not try to distinguish between demand elasticity and 
liquidity as explanations for discounts. Information asymmetry, on the other hand, is a more 
distinct concept. Information asymmetry could be a reason for a high cost of trading, as in 
some formal models of the bid-ask spread, and a higher cost implies lower liquidity. 
However, information asymmetry is not the only possible reason for inelastic demand. For 
empirical research, measures of information asymmetry can be constructed that are quite 
distinct from measures of liquidity or elasticity, as Lee and Masulis (2009) emphasise. 
Information asymmetry. Several studies, starting with Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003) and 
Corwin (2003), find that the discount in firm commitments is positively related to proxies for 
asymmetric information. Most of these studies do not set out in a formal way why 
information asymmetry might result in a discount. An exception is Hertzel and Smith (1993), 
who argue that discounts in private placements compensate investors for costs of 
investigating the issuer, and that the costs increase with the opacity of the issuer. Hertzel and 
Smith see the opportunity for a placee to investigate the issuer, and become better informed, 
as a benefit of the placement method. Consistent with this idea is evidence that firms 
choosing a private placement tend to be much smaller and less profitable than firms choosing 
a firm-commitment offer (Chen et al, 2010). Similarly, greater opacity is associated with 
choice of a private placement instead of a rights issue in Sweden (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 
2005). These findings suggest that placements are chosen by firms for which access to private 
information is especially valuable to investors. 
An alternative explanation that is based on information asymmetry is that the placees’ 
access to private information enables them to identify firms with overvalued share prices and 
to bargain down the issue price accordingly. Hertzel et al (2002), Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) 
and Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2010) find that, while the average long-run abnormal return 
after placements is negative if the shares are bought at the post-announcement market price, 
the benefit of discounts means that the long-run abnormal return from buying placement 
shares is approximately zero. There is also evidence that discounts in firm commitments are 
deeper in issues preceded by a large run-up of the issuer’s share price (Altinkiliç & Hansen, 
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2003; Corwin, 2003). Iqbal, Espenlaub and Strong (2009) report positive average abnormal 
returns preceding UK open offers. These results suggest that some companies time offers for 
when they believe they are overvalued, and that buyers of the shares can identify 
overvaluation. 
 Financial distress. Few existing studies include distress as an explanatory variable, 
although it would seem to be a natural candidate. Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Huson et al 
(2009) include a distress dummy in their studies of placement discounts, but they find it to be 
insignificant and only significant at the 5% level, respectively. However, distress is likely to 
be a reason for choosing a private placement rather than a public offer, and for issuing 
securities convertible into equity. Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2010) and Chen et al (2010) 
note that the majority of PIPEs are made by loss-making issuers, either because the firm is at 
an early stage of product development, or because it is in financial distress. Chen et al argue 
that PIPEs tend to be chosen as a last resort by companies that would find a firm-commitment 
offer impossible or more expensive. Chaplinsky and Haushalter argue that a deep discount 
might exacerbate adverse-selection and agency risks facing investors, in the same way as 
charging a high price for a loan might exacerbate such risks for a lender. They study a sample 
that consists of PIPEs at a discount, PIPEs with warrants attached, and issues of convertible 
preferred shares or debt, which have conversion terms that depend on the issuer’s future share 
price (‘resets’). Forty-three per cent of their sample consists of resets or issues with warrants. 
These instruments are viewed as reducing the contracting risks facing investors, and resets in 
particular are used in cases of severe distress. 
 In the light of the existing evidence, a key empirical question for UK open offers and 
placings is whether differences in discounts are better explained by differences across issuers 
in information asymmetry, or in elasticity of demand. The extent to which financial distress 
affects discounts also warrants investigation. 
 
3. Research method and sample 
3.1 Dependent variables 
We investigate which variables can explain discounts and costs by means of univariate 
comparisons and cross-sectional regressions. Our primary measure of the discount is 
calculated in relation to the pre-announcement share price: 
 
 Disc  =  (Pad–1 – Poffer)/Poffer  (1)  
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where Pad–1 is the midpoint share price at the close of the day before the announcement day 
(AD), and Poffer is the offer price.
10
 Pad–1 is taken from the prospectus, when it is stated, and 
otherwise from Datastream (the price is unadjusted for subsequent capital changes). 
Sometimes the prospectus records a pre-announcement price for a date earlier than AD–1, on 
the grounds that this was the last date before production of the prospectus. Since the offer 
price has to be set before the prospectus is finalised, and since we are interested in the 
determination of the discount using the last possible share price before the offer price is set, 
we use the price in the prospectus even if the date precedes AD–1. The Appendix provides 
further detail on the calculation of discounts, and describes three alternative measures.  
 
3.2 Explanatory variables 
Proxies for demand elasticity and liquidity of the shares. We use three measures of 
relative offer size, namely the number of new shares divided by the number of existing 
shares, Nnew/Nold (Relsize1); new shares divided by the number in the free float five days 
before the announcement, Nnew/Nfreefloat (Relsize2); and new shares divided by average daily 
trading volume, Nnew/μVolt (Relsize3), where μ is average and Volt is volume of trading on 
day t. μVolt is measured over AD–250 to AD–1. At first glance, relative offer size appears to 
be a good proxy for elasticity because, conceptually, it is not also a proxy for information 
asymmetry. But smaller companies tend to make larger offers in relation to their size (Table 
2), so in fact relative offer size is correlated with measures of information asymmetry. 
We are able to include two of the four proxies for elasticity in Gao and Ritter (2010). 
First, Inverse elasticity is a measure of how sensitive the share price is to trading volume on a 
given day t, calculated as μ[Rtnt(Volt/Nold,t)], i.e. it is the average of the absolute return on 
a given day divided by the proportion of shares in issue traded on that day, measured over 
AD–250 to AD–1. A larger number indicates greater inelasticity. The second measure is 
Volatility, the standard deviation of the pre-announcement abnormal returns, calculated using 
the variance of the errors from the market model over AD–250 to AD–1 if the data are 
available (a minimum of 30 trading days is required). The index model is also used as a 
robustness test, and it yields similar results.
11
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 The discount is expressed as a percentage of the offer price because this is how it is defined in most previous 
studies, and because the direct cost is always expressed as a percentage of the offer price. However, this 
definition means that a discount greater than 100% is possible. We go on to cap the discount at 100%. 
11
 The third proxy in Gao & Ritter is the proportion of the shares not owned by institutional investors as at AD–
1. The proportion of institutional ownership is available from Datastream for 310 of the 449 issues at a discount, 
though we are unsure about the ultimate source and reliability of these data. Because this variable is missing for 
many issues in our sample, and because of our doubts about its reliability, we do not include it in our reported 
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Many of the shares in our sample are highly illiquid, with high proportions of days with 
no trades. Lesmond (2005) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2007) find that, when 
illiquidity is severe, measures that incorporate daily trading volume, such as Inverse 
elasticity, are not highly correlated with the bid-ask spread and other measures of liquidity. 
This suggests that Inverse elasticity may not be a reliable measure in our sample. The 
preceding authors view the proportion of days with no trading as a reliable measure in illiquid 
markets. For this reason, we also use %notrade, the percentage of days with no trading during 
AD–250 to AD–1, as a direct measure of liquidity and elasticity.12  
Finally, we include two further variables that are widely used as proxies for liquidity: the 
quoted bid-ask Spread, calculated as the average of (Pask,t – Pbid,t)/[(Pask,t + Pbid,t)/2] over AD–
65 to AD–5, and Issuer size, measured by Pad–5Nold. In summary, there are eight proxies for 
elasticity. Three are measures of relative offer size, four of liquidity, and one of issuer size. 
Volatility, Spread and Issuer size are also commonly used as proxies for information 
asymmetry. 
Proxies for information asymmetry. We try to distinguish between demand elasticity or 
liquidity, and information asymmetry, by including four variables intended to measure 
information asymmetry unambiguously. The first is Tangibility, defined as 
(PPE+cash)/assets, the proportion of assets represented by plant, property, equipment and 
cash on the balance sheet for the end of the financial year preceding the year of the SEO. A 
higher value for this variable indicates less information asymmetry.
13
 Although asset 
tangibility is widely used as a measure of information asymmetry, it is possibly not a good 
measure in the UK context. Some companies in the sample do not report any intangible assets 
on their balance sheet, in which case Tangibility is usually given by one minus the proportion 
of stocks plus debtors in total assets. This will not reflect information asymmetry unless we 
believe that stocks and debtors are harder to value than plant, property and equipment. The 
other three variables are used in Lee and Masulis’ (2009) study of the direct costs of firm-
commitment offers. They are measures of the quality of a firm’s accounting information, 
which are argued to be relatively clean measures of information asymmetry. MDD and 
                                                                                                                                                        
analyses. We find in unreported results that non-institutional ownership is not significantly correlated with any 
of the other proxies for demand elasticity, and that it is not significant in either univariate or multivariate 
analyses. The fourth proxy in Gao and Ritter is the stock’s average price impact per trade, using TAQ data. We 
cannot calculate this measure as we do not have data on individual trades. 
12
 Eleven shares in the sample have no trades recorded on any of the 250 days. We exclude these from analyses 
involving %notrade and Inverse elasticity, as the trading data might be missing for these shares. 
13
 The source of the data for Tangibility is Datastream. Where PPE or Cash is missing in Datastream, the 
relevant numbers are taken from the accounts in the prospectus, if the accounts are provided.  
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AMDD are versions of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of earnings quality; ADA is a 
version of the Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) measure of discretionary accruals. The 
calculation of the three earnings-quality variables is described in the Appendix. These 
measures are secondary in Lee and Masulis (2009), in that they are used for robustness 
checks of their main results. Both of the primary measures in Lee and Masulis require eight 
consecutive years of accounting data per firm, up to the year of the SEO. This requirement is 
met for only a small minority of the firms in our sample. 
Proxies for financial distress. Three mutually exclusive dummy variables are included 
that indicate the financial status of the company. Distress = 1 if the prospectus says the issuer 
is likely to go into liquidation unless the issue proceeds; Loss = 1 if the issuer has made a pre-
tax loss in the two financial years preceding the issue; Plannedloss =1 if the issue has made 
losses in the past two years, but the losses appear to be expected because the company is at an 
early stage of development and sales are zero or very low. A positive relation is expected 
between the discount and each of these dummy variables. The relation should be weakest for 
Plannedloss. 
Control variables. Several control variables are included. The first is a dummy to capture 
the effect of any market timing by issuers: Highrunup = 1 if the abnormal return on the share 
calculated during AD–60 to AD–1 is in the top decile when shares are ranked by pre-
announcement abnormal return. If some companies time their issues following an exceptional 
run on their shares, they may offer a deeper discount to counteract potential investor concern 
about overvaluation. The second is a dummy variable to identify underwritten issues: 
Underwritten = 1 if the issue is underwritten in full or in part by the arranging bank. It is 
possible that the discount will be set deeper in an underwritten issue, in order to reduce the 
risk to the arranging bank.
14
 We also include dummy variables for year of issue and industry 
of the issuer (the results are similar without these dummy variables).  
 
3.3 Sample 
Our initial sample consists of all open offers and placings with a prospectus by UK-
registered companies during the ten years 1999-2008. Lists of share issues are available from 
Perfect Information and from the London Stock Exchange website. Data about the issue are 
hand-collected from prospectuses, obtained from Perfect Information and Companies House, 
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 In a previous version we include a low-price dummy: Lowprice = 1 if Pad–1 < 20p, and zero otherwise. This is 
intended to control for the effect of rounding in setting the offer price, if any. It is a significant variable in some 
regression specifications. However, Lowprice is a proxy for information asymmetry, distress, and illiquidity, 
and because of this muddiness about what Lowprice measures, we exclude it. 
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and market and accounting data are from Datastream. We require issues to have a prospectus 
in order to have a reliable source of information about the issue, and to ensure that the issue is 
worth more than five per cent of the existing equity (placings of five per cent or less do not 
have a prospectus). We exclude issues (i) by an investment trust or other investment vehicle; 
(ii) which lack basic information such as a clear announcement date; (iii) where the issuer’s 
shares have been suspended from trading; (iv) where the issuer’s share price is three pence or 
less on the day before the announcement. This last exclusion is to reduce the impact of 
rounding on percentage discounts when the price is very low. Recorded market prices include 
tenths and sometimes hundredths of a penny, but the smallest unit in the offer price is half a 
penny. Many US studies exclude issuers with a share price of two dollars or less. But a 
similar cut-off, say of one pound, would result in the exclusion of over half of our sample. 
 
Table 1 around here 
 
We are left with 498 issues; 338 open offers and 160 placings. Table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics. Open offers were more common than placings (worth in excess of 5% 
of the equity) during 1999-03, but placings were more common during 2004-08 (see Panel 
A). The mean discount across the full sample is 22.9%, and the mean for open offers is a little 
higher than that for placings. 
Forty-nine of the issues are at a premium, ie Pad–1  Poffer. We argue that it is preferable 
to exclude the issues at a premium, because many of them are different in nature from the 
issues at a discount. In 24 of the issues at a premium, at least 25% of the new shares are 
placed with one or a few buyers who are named in the prospectus. The main buyer is an 
operating company in seven cases, a private-equity or privately owned investment company 
in six cases, and a director or directors in 11 cases. Of the remaining 25 issues at a premium, 
15 are not underwritten despite being at a premium, which strongly suggests the presence of 
an undisclosed major buyer willing to pay the premium. When there is a single main buyer 
who is willing to pay a premium, it is likely that the buyer expects to add value or to obtain 
private benefits. Hence, we would not expect variables intended to explain discounts and fees 
to be as relevant for explaining premiums. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample excluding premiums (all 
the subsequent analyses exclude premiums). The mean (median) discount in this sample is 
25.9% (10.5%), and the mean cost of issue is 8.4% (6.7%). Thus the median cost of the 
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discount per new share to a shareholder who does not subscribe for new shares is 57% greater 
than the median cost in fees. The typical issuer is quite small, with illiquid shares; the mean 
market capitalisation is £81m (£32m) and the quoted bid-ask spread is 6.4% (5.0%).
15
 The 
relative offer size, is 92% (38%) measured by new shares divided by existing shares, and 537 
(195) times measured by new shares divided by daily trading volume. Unfortunately, missing 
data reduce the sample size materially for Relsize2, %noninst, and the three measures of 
earnings quality. 
Several of the variables display extreme values and highly skewed distributions. To 
alleviate this, we use henceforth the natural logarithm of Issuer size, the three measures of 
relative issue size, Inverse elasticity, and Volatility. We cap the discount at 100%; the mean 
discount with the cap is 20.8% (10.5%) and the standard deviation is 26.6%. We also 
winsorize the distribution of the bid-ask spread at its 1st and 99th percentile values. 
A final point is that warrants are not a common method of attracting investors in the UK. 
Only eight issues in our sample include an issue of warrants, of which two are by companies 
in severe distress. This differs from practice in the USA, where placements by distressed 
issuers quite often include warrants. 
  
4.  Results  
4.1 Cross-correlations 
 
Table 2 around here 
 
Table 2 presents correlations between the discount and the continuous variables used. 
The highest correlations with Disc are for Spread, Issuer size and the three measures of 
relative offer size, with coefficients between 0.31 and 0.49. The highest correlations between 
the explanatory variables are between the measures of relative offer size, and between Spread 
and Issuer size (–0.71), i.e. small companies have a large spread. Relative offer size is 
negatively correlated with issuer size (–0.56 for Relsize1), i.e. smaller companies tend to 
make larger issues in relation to their size. Several of the other elasticity variables are 
moderately correlated with each other, including Inverse elasticity with Spread (0.33) and 
with %notrade (0.29), and Volatility with Spread (0.30). Issuer size is negatively correlated 
                                                 
15
 Half of the spread is a measure of the future cost to buyers of selling their new shares. Most discounts are 
much larger than the half-spread for the relevant firm, indicating that the half-spread cannot directly explain the 
bulk of the discount. This assumes that the shares can be sold at the bid price. 
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to varying degrees with the other elasticity variables, as Gao and Ritter (2010) find. We note 
that, despite moderate levels of cross-correlation, multicollinearity is present among the 
measures of elasticity, as explained in Section 4.3. 
Regarding the three measures of earnings quality, MDD3 and AMDD are highly 
correlated (0.69), as expected, and both are modestly correlated with some of the other 
variables that might proxy for information asymmetry, including Spread, Volatility and Issuer 
size. However, ADA and Tangibility have low or negligible correlation with MDD3, AMDD, 
and other possible proxies for information asymmetry, suggesting that they are not reliable 
measures of information asymmetry in our sample. Tangibility and ADA are the variables that 
have the least connection with Disc and with the other variables. 
 
4.2 Regression results  
 
Table 3 around here  
 
Table 3 shows univariate OLS regression results for all the variables except the year and 
industry dummies. The dependent variable is Disc. We expect a positive relationship between 
Disc and all the variables except Issuer size. All eight of the elasticity variables have 
coefficients with the sign expected if demand is inelastic, and the coefficients are significant 
with a p-value of 0.010 or below. The four proxies for information asymmetry have the 
expected sign but are much less significant; the most significant is ADA (p = 0.032). Distress, 
Loss and Plannedloss all have the expected sign and are significant, with a p-value of 0.010 
or below. The same applies to Highrunup. Underwritten has the opposite sign (negative) to 
the sign expected, and its p-value is 0.001. The significance of Underwritten could be due to 
the fact that non-underwritten issues are done by smaller companies; the mean market 
capitalisation for non-underwritten issues is £29.9m, compared with £112.9m for 
underwritten issues. 
 
Table 4 around here 
  
Table 4 presents multivariate OLS regression results for a selection of models. 
Coefficients for seven of the elasticity variables are shown in turn, with the non-elasticity 
variables included. Each of the elasticity variables has the predicted sign and is significant, 
with a p-value of 0.031 or below. The eighth, Relsize2, is also significant (p = 0.000), but we 
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do not report regressions that include this variable because the sample size is only 292.
16
 
Inverse elasticity has a p-value of 0.026. Its relatively low explanatory power is surprising, 
since Gao & Ritter (2010) consider this to be the most effective of their four measures. We 
suspect that the low trading volumes observed in some of the shares in our sample reduce the 
effectiveness of this variable in measuring elasticity, as mentioned in Section 3.2. 
Of the variables to measure information asymmetry, we only report results for 
regressions which include Tangibility at this stage, since the samples are smaller for the 
earnings-quality variables. Tangibility is not significantly related to the discount. This does 
not support the information-asymmetry explanation for discounts. In unreported regressions, 
the earnings-quality variables are not significant either. 
Distress is consistently highly significant, and Loss is also significant with p below 
0.010. Plannedloss has varying levels of significance. Highrunup and Underwritten are not 
significant in any specification. 
We have a number of proxies for elasticity and it is not clear which proxy, or which 
combination of proxies, gives the best measure. We experiment with various combinations of 
proxies, and in unreported results we find that the significance of a given proxy is not always 
consistent across different regression specifications. For example, Spread is not usually 
significant in models that include Volatility. However, the F-test confirms that, whatever 
other variables are included in a given regression, the elasticity variables are always jointly 
significant at the 1% level.  
The pairwise correlations reported in Table 2 are mostly not high enough to suggest that 
multicollinearity will be a serious problem, with one or two exceptions (for example, Spread 
and Issuer size are highly negatively correlated). Similarly, the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
test is generally below ten for the explanatory variables in regressions with combinations of 
proxies for elasticity, indicating that multicollinearity should not be a serious concern. But 
Greene (1997, p. 421) suggests that multicollinearity will be a concern whenever the overall 
R-squared for a regression is less than one or more of the partial R-squareds, ie the R-squared 
for a regression of one of the explanatory variables on the remaining explanatory variables. 
We find that the partial R-squareds for all the elasticity proxies except Inverse elasticity 
exceed the overall R-squareds for any of the regressions in reported in Table 4. 
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 For the sample of 292 issues for which we can calculate Relsize2, there is little difference in the significance 
of offer size in relation to existing shares (Relsize1) and free float (Relsize2). So we do not echo the finding of 
Intintoli and Kahle (2009) for US firm commitments that size in relation to free float has greater explanatory 
power. 
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Table 5 around here 
 
In view of this finding, we argue that principal components analysis is likely to produce a 
better measure of demand elasticity than any of the individual proxies or combination of 
these proxies. This technique has been proposed for coping with independent variables that 
display multicollinearity, as we find in our case, and capture common information.
17
 Given 
the high collinearity between the elasticity proxies suggested by the partial R-squared results, 
it is likely that a small number of principal components will account for the variation in the 
Disc. Table 5 presents OLS results with the first principal component, Elasticity,  as an 
explanatory variable. All the loadings for the proxies are positive, which means that the first 
principal component is a simple weighted average of the seven proxies from Table 4 (Issuer 
size has the opposite sign to that of the other variables, and so its inverse is used in 
calculating the principal components). Elasticity is highly significant across all specifications 
(p < 0.000), and the R-squareds of the regressions are substantially higher than in Table 4. 
The regressions in Table 5 include all of the proxies for information asymmetry, but none 
achieve significance (p  0.100).18 Models 2 and 6 include proxies for information 
asymmetry without the control variables, to check if asymmetric information is insignificant 
due to collinearity with some of the control variables. The results suggest that collinearity 
with control variables does not account for the lack of significance. Distress remains highly 
significant, with p-values below 0.02, and Loss has p-values below 0.06. If our proxies for 
information asymmetry are reliable, these results provide clear evidence that inelastic 
demand, rather than information asymmetry, drives discounts in UK SEOs. Financial distress 
is an important additional factor. However, as mentioned already, it is possible that 
Tangibility is a poor measure of information asymmetry. In addition, data limitations mean 
that we cannot calculate the earnings-quality variables with as many years of data as we 
would wish. So a possible explanation for the lack of significance of the proxies for 
information asymmetry is that they do not measure information asymmetry accurately. 
 
                                                 
17
 See, for example, Greene (1997), pp. 424-7. Linck, Netter and Yang (2008) use the principal factor of three 
variables to proxy for complexity within a board of directors and the principal factor of three variables to proxy 
for the costs of monitoring and advising. Armstrong, Core and Guay (2012) use a similar methodology to 
develop an information cost factor that is a function of various firm characteristics, such as firm size, age, 
growth, investment, and risk. The method is also widely used in the asset pricing literature; ‘macro factors’ are 
derived from a principal components methodology. 
18
 We also run the regressions having winsorized the three measures of earnings quality at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. The results are unaffected. 
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Table 6 around here 
 
 The discounts in our sample differ greatly in size, and the sensitivity of discounts to our 
explanatory variables might with the size of discounts. In view of this, we use quantile 
regression to investigate the explanatory power of the variables for different ranges in the 
distribution of Disc. Table 6 reports coefficients that result from minimising a weighted sum 
of the absolute values of the errors. For example, the regression quantile for the tenth 
percentile, q10, results from applying a weight of 0.10 for positive errors and 0.90 for 
negative errors. So all the data are used, but with different weights. Since negative errors are 
associated with smaller discounts, q10 primarily estimates the relations between Disc and the 
explanatory variables for small values of Disc. Quantile regression differs from partitioning 
the sample by size of the dependent variable, and running OLS regressions for each of the 
subsamples resulting from the partition. OLS regression for a given subsample ignores data 
that fall outside the subsample, and partition can lead to sample-selection bias.
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 The results in Table 6 show that Elasticity is significant at the 1% level for all the 
quantiles, vis q10, q25, q50, q75 and q90. However, the effect of elasticity is much larger for 
the higher quantiles of the distribution; the coefficients on Elasticity are 0.073 for q90 and 
0.011 for q10, and 0.050 for q75 and 0.019 for q25 (see the last two columns for tests of the 
differences between the coefficients). In other words, differences in elasticity of demand 
explain more of the differences in large discounts than in small discounts. Distress and Loss 
are only significant for q75 and q90, as would be expected, since these quantiles place most 
weight on large discounts,
20
 and most distressed issuers have a deep discount. The other 
variables are never significant. The pseudo R-squared of the quantile regressions increases 
monotonically in moving from q10 to q90, from 0.06 to 0.41. The results of the quantile 
regressions show that differences in elasticity across shares, and whether the issuer is in 
financial distress, are capable of explaining much of the substantial variation observed in the 
deeper discounts.
21
 
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
                                                 
19
 For another example of the application of quantile regression, and further discussion, see Hallock, Madalozzo 
and Reck (2010). 
20
 More accurately, the weight of x in the regression quantile for the xth percentile applies to discounts lying 
above the standard OLS regression line. 
21
 We also partition the sample around the median value of Disc, and run OLS regressions for each subsample. 
The R-squared for larger discounts is much larger than for the smaller discounts. 
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To check whether the results are robust to different measures of discount, we replicate 
the regression and principal component analyses with each of three alternative measures, 
detailed in the Appendix, as the dependent variable. The results (not reported) are 
qualitatively similar. Our variables have similar explanatory power for the average discount 
calculated over 30 days before the announcement as they do for Disc. The explanatory power 
is less for the other two measures. The results are also robust to different specifications of the 
explanatory variables. For example, using unadjusted variables instead of log transformations 
does affect the main findings. 
We note in Section 3.2 that Volatility, Spread and Issuer size are commonly used as 
proxies for information asymmetry, as well as demand elasticity. To check that the lack of 
significance of the four unambiguous proxies for information asymmetry is not due to the 
presence of Volatility, Spread and Issuer size, we run the regressions and principal 
components analysis without these three variables. The four unambiguous proxies for 
information asymmetry do not become more significant. 
A few of the shares are only traded a handful of times during the 250 days preceding the 
issue. The presence of such shares might compromise the impact of Volatility on the discount, 
as they might have low volatility due to absence of trading, but in fact have a very uncertain 
share price. In addition, the discount might not be reliably measured, if the market price is 
‘stale’. For this reason we re-run the regressions in Tables 4 and 5 with a sample that 
excludes the 10% of issuers with the least actively traded shares. The results are unaffected. 
Finally, in 30 of the sample, other securities were issued at the same time as the equity. 
The results are similar when these issues are excluded. We also try excluding the issues 
which were made in order to finance a takeover, as the offer price could be affected by the 
takeover, especially if shares are issued to the target company’s shareholders. The results are 
similar for the sample excluding takeovers. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The discounts in open offers and placings are large and they vary considerably across 
different offers. This is the first study to focus on explaining the variation in UK discounts. 
While most existing evidence focuses on US SEOs, several of the explanations provided are 
not relevant for the UK, or are unlikely to matter as much. We test the view that the primary 
explanation for discounts in UK SEOs lies with limited demand on the part of investors and 
limited liquidity of the shares.  
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Our empirical study includes eight proxies for elasticity of demand and liquidity, 
together with a range of other variables including proxies for asymmetric information and 
financial distress. Since there is a problem of multicollinearity between the elasticity 
variables, we use principal components analysis to measure elasticity by means of a single 
variable, the first principal component. We attempt to distinguish between elasticity and 
information asymmetry by including four measures designed to measure information 
asymmetry unambiguously. Three of these four are proxies for earnings quality, following 
Lee and Masulis (2009).  
The results support the hypothesis that inelastic demand and illiquidity are a primary 
cause of the large and variable discounts observed in the UK. The results also show that 
severe distress independently adds to the depth of the discount. In contrast, the four proxies 
for information asymmetry have no explanatory power in our multivariate regressions. But it 
is possible that the proxies for asymmetric information lack significance because they are 
unreliable. Quantile regressions reveal that issues with large discounts are more sensitive to 
elasticity and distress than those with small discounts.  
The results add to the evidence that it is difficult and expensive for small-cap companies 
to raise equity, even if their shares are listed on a stock market. The results suggest that 
inelastic demand has an important role in explaining the large and diverse SEO discounts in 
the UK, which are a cost to nonsubscribing shareholders. We recognise, though, that it is 
difficult to distinguish empirically between information asymmetry and inelastic demand, 
and, indeed, information asymmetry could be a cause of inelastic demand. The underlying 
causes of inelastic demand, and its impact on the issuance of securities and on the secondary 
trading of large blocks, warrant further study. 
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Appendix 
A1. Other explanations for discounts that are of little or no relevance in the UK 
Appendix A1 summarises explanations for discounts in US SEOs that are of little or no 
relevance to UK SEOs. The first is that the new shares in a private placement cannot be sold 
until registration has been declared effective by the SEC, except through a privately 
negotiated trade. Bajaj et al. (2001) and Robak (2007) present evidence that this restriction on 
re-sale accounts for much or all of the discount in US placements, and Maynes and Pandes 
(2010) find that discounts in Canadian placements became less deep after 2001, when the 
mandatory restricted period for re-sale was reduced in length. In the UK there is no restriction 
on when the new shares can be sold, so this key explanation for discounts in placements does 
not apply in our sample. 
Second, several explanations for discounts depend on the fact that in the majority of US 
placements there is one buyer, or one clearly identifiable lead buyer. (i) Discounts in 
placements led by a hedge fund are much deeper than in placements led by a venture-capital 
(VC) fund. In fact, 34% of VC-led private placements are at a premium. It seems that hedge 
funds are more willing to make risky, speculative investments, but require a higher expected 
return via a deeper discount and via other features that enhance expected returns, such as 
warrants. (Brophy, Ouimet and Sialm, 2006;  Dai, 2007;  Dai, Jo and Schatzberg, 2010). (ii) 
A discount could exist to compensate an ‘active’ investor for their cost of monitoring the 
issuer after the placement (Wruck, 1989; Wruck and Wu, 2009), although Barclay et al 
(2007) argue that the placee is passive in most cases. Discounts are less deep, or the 
placement is at a premium, when the placee is a strategic-alliance partner or another affiliated 
investor (Wu, 2004; Krishnamurthy et al, 2005). (iii) Incumbent managers could use 
discounts to reward themselves or a passive placee who will support them (Wu, 2004; 
Barclay et al, 2007). 
There is no lead buyer in bulk of UK open offers and placings. A lead investor is rarely 
named in the prospectus. Armitage (2010) studies the placees in UK open offers and placings, 
and finds that the largest placee usually buys substantially less than half the issue. The mean 
of the number of buyers identified per offer is 29. 
Third, several studies find that, controlling for other factors affecting the discount, 
superior underwriter reputation is associated with a smaller discount in firm commitments. 
However, there is no generally recognised ranking of UK arranging banks by reputation. We 
record the name(s) of the arranger(s) for each SEO in our sample, and we find in untabulated 
results that there are around 25 banks which are active in the SEO business, each of which 
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arranges one or two of the issues per year in our sample. Hence, the business is not 
concentrated in the UK and there are no obvious market leaders by number of issues. This 
view is corroborated by the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT, 2011). 
Fourth, Mola and Loughran (2004) argue that the lead bank in firm-commitment offers 
leaves money on the table for investors by setting the offer price at an integer (of one dollar), 
below the pre-issue market price. Similarly, deeper discounts for NASDAQ firms could be 
explained by the practice of setting the offer price at the bid price in the NASDAQ market. 
Discounts in the UK are mostly too large for pricing at an integer (of one penny) potentially 
to explain more than a small proportion of the discount. 
 Finally, Kim and Shin (2004) argue that the discounts in firm commitments are partly 
driven by the introduction of SEC Rule 10b-21 in 1988, which banned short selling before the 
issue day, and arguably made the pre-issue market price less informative about value. There 
is no ban on short selling in the UK. But the offer price is set before the issue is public 
knowledge, and investors who agree to become informed about the offer before it is 
announced undertake not to trade in the shares until after the announcement. So possibly the 
arranging bank views the share price as not fully informative at the time the offer price is set. 
 
A2. Further detail on calculation of discounts 
In cases where the new shares are not entitled to the next dividend, the discount is 
calculated as 
 Disc  =  (Pad–1 – Div – Poffer)/Poffer,  (2) 
where Div is the dividend per share to which the new shares are not entitled. The three other 
measures of the discount described below are also adjusted for non-entitlement to the next 
dividend. 
A few of the issues to fund an acquisition are accompanied by an issue of ‘consideration 
shares’, that is, shares issued to the shareholders of a company being acquired as full- or part-
consideration for the equity. We ignore consideration shares in calculating the discount and 
offer size, except for consideration shares that are placed on behalf of the recipients, in which 
case they form part of a normal placing. Implicitly, consideration shares are treated as being 
issued at the same price as the post-announcement share price. 
Some issues are accompanied by a share consolidation, in which case one new share 
replaces a multiple of existing shares, in order to increase the market price per share (but with 
no effect on market value). If the consolidation is to take place before the new shares are 
issued, about four weeks after the announcement, the offer price and number of the new 
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shares are expressed in the prospectus on the assumption that the consolidation has already 
taken place. In this case the price and number of the existing shares must also be amended, so 
that they too are expressed on a consolidated basis when calculating the discount and relative 
offer size. 
 
A3. Alternative measures of discount 
In an open offer the existing shares lose their entitlement to new shares on the ex-rights 
day, which is either the announcement day or the day after. If Pad–1 > Poffer, the entitlement 
has value as at AD–1. The share price will be expected to fall by the value of the entitlement, 
to the theoretical ex-rights price (TERP) as at AD–1. Allowing for this predictable and 
mechanical effect, and assuming no change in the value of the issuer as a result of the 
announcement, the value of the discount is calculated in relation to the TERP: 
 Discterp  =  (TERPad–1 – Poffer)/Poffer (3)  
and TERPad–1 = (Pad–1Nold + PofferNnewprorata)/N, where Nold is the number of existing shares as 
at AD–1, Nnewprorata is the number of new shares offered pro rata to existing shareholders, and 
N = Nold + Nnewprorata. The concept of the TERP only applies to shares offered pro rata, to 
which the existing shares have an entitlement that ceases on the ex-rights day. If shares are 
sold at a discount in a placing, with no pro rata entitlement, it is not clear that a fall in the 
share price would be expected on the announcement day as a result of the discount on the 
placing shares (see Armitage, 2012, for a full discussion).
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 Therefore Discterp only applies to 
the shares in open offers. 
Second, one can argue that companies can anticipate any share-price reaction to the 
announcement of an issue (ie the ‘information effect’). In this case the discount should be 
measured in relation to the post-announcement share price, and several US studies measure 
discounts in this way. So we calculate the discount using the observed market price on 
AD+1: 
 Discad+1  =  (Pad+1 – Poffer)/Poffer (4)  
Third, the offer price might be set in relation to an average of the share price preceding 
the announcement day; there are occasional statements in prospectuses that the offer price has 
been set on this basis. The offer price is thereby less affected by any large price movements 
just before the announcement. We calculate the discount using the average market price over 
the thirty days before the announcement: 
                                                 
22
 Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003) estimate the expected level of discount in firm-commitment offers, from which 
they derive a value for the discount surprise, which, they argue, should affect the share price on the issue day. 
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 Discad–30,ad–1  =  [μ(Pad–30,ad–1) – Poffer)/Poffer (5) 
 
A4. Calculation of three variables measuring accruals quality 
(i) Modified Dechow-Dichev measure (MDD3 in Lee and Masulis, 2009). The following 
regression is run using the sample of all listed firms in the same industry group as SEO firm j, 
for years t–2 to t, where t is the financial year in which the SEO took place. Industry groups 
are defined using the Industry Classification Benchmark classification, level two (11 industry 
groups), to ensure a good number of companies in each industry. 
 CAj,t  =   + 1CFOj,t–1 + 2CFOj,t + 3CFOj,t+1 + 4Salesj,t + 5PPEj,t + ej,t (6) 
where CAj,t = current accruals for company j in financial year t (change in current assets 
minus change in current liabilities minus change in cash holdings plus change in debt due 
within one year), CFOj,t = cash flow from operations (net income before extraordinary items 
minus current accruals minus depreciation and amortization), Salesj,t = the change in sales 
from year t–1 to year t, PPEj,t = gross property, plant and equipment, and ej,t is the error term. 
These variables are scaled by the average of total assets for firm j for year t–1 and year t.  
MDD3 for j is given by the standard deviation of the three error terms. The source of the 
accounting information is Datastream.  
(ii) Absolute MDD (AMDD) is simply the absolute value of ej,t. This requires two years’ 
less data than does MDD3. The two MDD variables are designed to measure deviation in the 
value of current accruals from the value that would normally be expected, whether or not the 
cause of the deviation is deliberate manipulation of accruals and earnings by management.  
(iii) Absolute Discretionary Accruals (ADA) Each SEO firm is matched, by return on 
assets for the financial year t in which the SEO took place, with another firm in the same 
industry group. For all the firms in firm j’s industry, the following regression is run for year t: 
 TAj,t  =   + 1(1/Assetsj,t–1) + 2Salesj,t + 3PPEj,t + ej,t (7) 
where TAj,t is total accruals (current accruals plus depreciation and amortization), and  
Assetsj,t is total assets. The ADA measure is the absolute value of the difference between ej,t 
and the error term for year t for j’s matched firm. We also calculate MDD and ADA for the 
year prior to the SEO, t = –1, but the results using the re-calculated MDD and ADA do not 
change. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
In Table 1 all values are calculated from the raw data, with no adjustments. The numbers in the sample for each variable differ because of missing data, because 11 
companies with zero trades in the shares are excluded from the %notrade sample, and because 16 insurance companies and banks are excluded from the Tangibility 
sample. In defining the explanatory variables, Pad–1 is the share price of the issuing company as at the close of the day before the announcement day; Poffer is the offer price; 
Nnew is the number of shares in the issue; Nfreefloat is the number of the issuer’s shares in the free float five days before the announcement; μVolt is the average daily trading 
volume in the issuer’s shares over the 250 trading days preceding the announcement (AD–250 to AD–1); μ[Rtnt(Volt/Nold,t)] is the average over AD–250 to AD–1 of the 
absolute return on a given day divided by the proportion of shares in issue traded on that day; Nold is the number of shares in issue as at the announcement day; Stdev(ARt) 
is the standard deviation of the abnormal returns calculated using the index model for AD–250 to AD–1; μ{(Pask,t – Pbid,t)/[(Pask,t + Pbid,t)/2]} is average of the quoted bid-
ask spread for each day over AD–65 to AD–5; %notrade is the proportion of days with no trading during AD–250 to AD–1; (PPE+cash)/assets is the proportion of asset 
value represented by plant, property, equipment and cash as at AD–1; EQ1: MDD3 and EQ2: AMDD are modified Dechow-Dichev measures of earnings quality, and EQ3: 
ADA is a measure of absolute discretionary accruals. The three measures of earnings quality are explained in the Appendix; higher values indicate lower informativeness of 
earnings. N is the number of observations. Sources: prospectuses for information about the issue, including Pad–1 if provided, and Datastream for all other data.  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 
Panel A: all issues Open offers Placings Full sample 
Number:  1999-03 231 23 254 
 2004-08 107 137 244 
 1999-08 (full sample) 338 160 498 
Number of issues at a discount: Pad–1 > Poffer  331 138 449 
Number of issues at a premium: Pad–1  Poffer 27 22 49 
Mean discount 24.3% 20.0% 22.9% 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 
Panel B: issues at a discount  Min  Max Mean Median N 
 
Disc: (Pad–1 – Poffer)/Poffer 0.4% 427.0% 25.9% 10.5% 449 
Proceeds: PofferNnew £0.6m £570.2m £23.2m £10.5m 449 
Offer price: Poffer 1.0p 340.0p 132.6p 57.0p 449 
 
Measures of elasticity  
Relsize1: Nnew/Nold 0.03 118.8 0.92 0.38 449 
Relsize2: Nnew/Nfreefloat  0.03 320.9 2.50 0.72 294 
Relsize3: Nnew/μVolt 0.52 39,688.6 536.5 194.5 438 
Inverse elasticity: μ[Rtnt(Volt/Nold,t)] 0 684 36 19 438 
Volatility: Stdev(ARt)  100 0.0% 162.3% 14.7% 7.5% 447 
Spread: μ{(Pask,t – Pbid,t)/[(Pask,t + Pbid,t)/2]} 0.5% 50.1% 6.4% 5.0% 449 
Proportion of no-trading days: %notrade 2.0% 99.2% 23.1% 9.8% 438 
Issuer size: Pad–5Nold £1.1m £1,618.0m £81.4m £32.1m 449 
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Panel B cont.: issues at a discount  Min  Max Mean Median N 
 
Measures of information asymmetry 
Tangibility: (PPE+cash)/assets 0.3% 99.9% 42.3% 34.5% 433 
EQ1: MDD3 0.00% 1.99% 0.12% 0.06% 357 
EQ2: AMDD 0.00% 3.15% 0.10% 0.05% 349 
EQ3: ADA 0.00% 14.30% 0.22% 0.10% 416 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 2 
Correlation coefficients 
 
The table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the continuous variables. The sample in this and subsequent tables includes only issues at a discount, and the 
variables incorporate the following adjustments: Disc is capped at 100%; the Relsize measures, Inverse elasticity, Volatility, and Issuer size are the natural logarithm of the 
corresponding variables; Spread is winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
Disc Relsize1 Relsize2 Relsize3 
Inverse 
elast’y 
Volati-
lity 
Spread 
% 
notrade 
Issuer 
size 
Tangib-
ility 
EQ1: 
MDD3 
EQ2: 
AMDD 
EQ3: 
ADA 
Disc 1             
Relsize1 0.41 1            
Relsize2 0.49 0.92 1           
Relsize3 0.31 0.65 0.65 1          
Inverse elasticity 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.39 1         
Volatility 0.38 0.25 0.30 –0.13 –0.00 1        
Spread 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.33 0.30 1       
%notrade 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.40 0.29 –0.21 0.31 1      
Issuer size –0.38 –0.56 –0.48 –0.42 –0.19 –0.22 –0.71 –0.28 1     
Tangibility 0.00 –0.04 –0.08 0.05 –0.03 –0.07 –0.06 0.04 0.07 1    
EQ1: MDD3 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.19 0.26 –0.01 –0.19 –0.07 1   
EQ2: AMDD 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.00 –0.17 –0.08 0.69 1  
EQ3: ADA –0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 –0.00 –0.00 –0.05 –0.09 0.03 0.18 1 
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Table 3 
Univariate results 
 
The table shows the results of univariate OLS regressions. The continuous variables are defined in 
Table 1. Distress = 1 when the prospectus states that the firm is likely to go into liquidation unless the 
issue proceeds; Loss = 1 when the firm has losses for the two financial years preceding the 
announcement, and the losses do not appear to have been anticipated; Plannedloss = 1 when the firm 
has losses for the two financial years preceding the announcement, and the losses appear to have been 
anticipated; Highrunup = 1 if the abnormal return on the share calculated during AD–60 to AD–1 is 
in the top decile when shares are ranked by pre-announcement abnormal return; Underwritten = 1 
when the offer is (at least partly) underwritten. 
 
  Coefficient p-value R
2
 N 
     
Relsize1 0.114 0.000 0.171 449 
     
Relsize2 0.117 0.000 0.242 294 
     
Relsize3 0.061 0.000 0.094 438 
     
Inverse elasticity 0.042 0.003 0.026 437 
     
Volatility 0.086 0.000 0.144 447 
     
Spread 2.190 0.000 0.185 449 
     
%notrade 0.132 0.010 0.019 449 
     
Issuer size -0.072 0.000 0.140 449 
     
Tangibility 0.019 0.643 0.001 435 
     
MDD3 0.286 0.032 0.031 274 
     
AMDD 0.256 0.061 0.019 349 
     
ADA 0.040 0.290 0.002 416 
     
Distress 0.307 0.000 0.133 449 
     
Loss 0.087 0.010 0.018 449 
     
Plannedloss 0.139 0.000 0.060 449 
     
Highrunup 0.065 0.180 0.006 449 
     
Underwritten -0.089 0.001 0.027 443 
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Table 4  
OLS regressions for discounts 
 
The dependent variable is Disc. The continuous variables are defined in Table 1 and the dummy 
variables, which are from Distress down, are defined in Table 3. The adjustments described in Table 2 
are applied. The table reports regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust p-values in 
brackets. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Relsize1 0.085       
 [0.000]       
Relsize3  0.049      
  [0.000]      
Inverse elasticity   0.033     
   [0.026]     
Spread    1.701    
    [0.000]    
Volatility     0.055   
     [0.000]   
Issuer size      -0.053  
      [0.000]  
%notrade       0.115 
       [0.031] 
Tangibility 0.020 -0.006 0.009 0.031 0.045 0.027 0.013 
 [0.573] [0.859] [0.812] [0.364] [0.223] [0.442] [0.721] 
Distress 0.188 0.217 0.269 0.235 0.246 0.242 0.273 
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Loss 0.106 0.119 0.134 0.094 0.121 0.098 0.141 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.008] [0.000] [0.006] [0.000] 
Plannedloss 0.060 0.085 0.070 0.029 0.028 0.050 0.080 
 [0.068] [0.010] [0.041] [0.415] [0.406] [0.151] [0.015] 
Highrunup 0.019 0.011 -0.007 0.024 -0.024 0.047 0.006 
 [0.738] [0.849] [0.909] [0.650] [0.661] [0.423] [0.917] 
Underwritten -0.043 -0.038 -0.041 0.003 -0.034 0.006 -0.035 
 [0.103] [0.176] [0.146] [0.925] [0.215] [0.843] [0.218] 
        
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 430 419 418 430 428 430 430 
        
R
2 
0.314 0.291 0.252 0.314 0.276 0.289 0.251 
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Table 5 
OLS regressions with principal component 
 
Elasticity is the first principal component resulting from a principal components analysis involving 
seven proxies for demand elasticity, namely Relsize1, Relsize3, Inverse elasticity, Spread, Volatility, 
Issuer size and %notrade. The continuous variables are defined in Table 1 and the dummy variables, 
which are from Distress down, are defined in Table 3. The adjustments described in Table 2 are 
applied. The table reports regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust p-values in brackets.  
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Elasticity 0.061 0.074 0.058 0.074 0.054 0.053 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Tangibility 0.014 0.000     
 [0.688] [0.998]     
AQ1: MDD3   0.044 0.117   
   [0.522] [0.110]   
AQ2:AMDD     0.103  
     [0.402]  
AQ3: ADA      0.057 
      [0.644] 
Distress 0.195  0.253  0.208 0.158 
 [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.002] [0.018] 
Loss 0.072  0.088  0.076 0.090 
 [0.035]  [0.019]  [0.060] [0.046] 
Planned loss 0.040  0.019  0.017 0.044 
 [0.234]  [0.524]  [0.575] [0.195] 
Highrunup 0.017  0.033  0.020 0.055 
 [0.767]  [0.510]  [0.691] [0.455] 
Underwritten 0.007  0.022  -0.001 -0.003 
 [0.805]  [0.469]  [0.970] [0.940] 
       
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 416 421 342 344 332 264 
R
2
 0.348 0.282 0.399 0.313 0.355 0.361 
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Table 6 
Quantile regressions 
 
The table reports coefficients that result from minimising a weighted sum of the absolute values of 
the errors in regressions in which Disc is the dependent variable. For example, the regression quantile 
for the tenth percentile, q10, results from applying a weight of 0.10 for positive errors and 0.90 for 
negative errors. p-values are based on bootstrapped standard errors using 1,000 replications. The last 
two columns show differences between coefficients, with p-values of a test of the significance of the 
difference. The continuous variables are defined in Table 1 and the dummy variables, which are from 
Distress down, are defined in Table 3. The adjustments described in Table 2 are applied. 
 
  q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 q75-q25 q90-q10 
        
Elasticity  0.011 0.019 0.031 0.050 0.073 0.032 0.062 
 [0.009] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.008] [0.013] 
        
Tangibility 0.001 0.008 0.012 0.011 -0.040 0.003 -0.041 
 [0.947] [0.575] [0.522] [0.768] [0.579] [0.941] [0.567] 
        
Distress 0.020 0.022 0.094 0.504 0.431 0.482 0.410 
 [0.317] [0.497] [0.508] [0.000] [0.007] [0.000] [0.010] 
        
Loss 0.011 0.007 0.025 0.123 0.289 0.116 0.277 
 [0.435] [0.640] [0.315] [0.034] [0.055] [0.040] [0.061] 
        
Plannedloss 0.010 0.012 0.046 0.029 0.015 0.017 0.005 
 [0.497] [0.515] [0.017] [0.320] [0.864] [0.572] [0.949] 
        
Highrunup 0.001 0.002 0.018 0.019 0.061 0.017 0.060 
 [0.974] [0.931] [0.527] [0.704] [0.807] [0.743] [0.798] 
        
Underwritten -0.006 0.000 -0.004 -0.025 -0.001 -0.024 0.005 
 [0.535] [0.965] [0.836] [0.436] [0.992] [0.423] [0.928] 
        
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
N 416 416 416 416 416 416 416 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.057 0.072 0.112 0.280 0.407     
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